virus: Insecure Voting by Design

From: Jei (jei@cc.hut.fi)
Date: Tue Dec 16 2003 - 11:44:35 MST

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    Thought this might be worth noting to a few...

    ---------- Forwarded message ----------
    Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2003 03:07:23 -0600 (CST)
    From: InfoSec News <isn@c4i.org>
    To: isn@attrition.org
    Subject: Re: [ISN] Voting-Machine Makers To Fight Security Criticism

    Forwarded from: Henry Schwan <owlswan@eff.org>

    An important question to be asked is if all the other electronic
    machines that Diebold and others make leave a paper trail, why was
    the paper trail in voting machines specifically left out. See:

    No Confidence Vote: Why the Current Touch Screen Voting Fiasco Was
    Pretty Much Inevitable

    <http://www.pbs.org/cringely/pulpit/pulpit20031204.html>

    -----snip----

    Now here's the really interesting part. Forgetting for a moment
    Diebold's voting machines, let's look at the other equipment they
    make. Diebold makes a lot of ATM machines. They make machines that
    sell tickets for trains and subways. They make store checkout
    scanners, including self-service scanners. They make machines that
    allow access to buildings for people with magnetic cards. They make
    machines that use magnetic cards for payment in closed systems like
    university dining rooms. All of these are machines that involve data
    input that results in a transaction, just like a voting machine. But
    unlike a voting machine, every one of these other kinds of Diebold
    machines -- EVERY ONE -- creates a paper trail and can be audited.
    Would Citibank have it any other way? Would Home Depot? Would the
    CIA? Of course not. These machines affect the livelihood of their
    owners. If they can't be audited they can't be trusted. If they
    can't be trusted they won't be used.

    Now back to those voting machines. If EVERY OTHER kind of machine you
    make includes an auditable paper trail, wouldn't it seem logical to
    include such a capability in the voting machines, too? Given that
    what you are doing is adapting existing technology to a new purpose,
    wouldn't it be logical to carry over to voting machines this
    capability that is so important in every other kind of transaction
    device?

    This confuses me. I'd love to know who said to leave the feature out
    and why?

    Next week: the answer.

    InfoSec News wrote:

    > http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A47436-2003Dec8.html
    >
    > By Jonathan Krim
    > Washington Post Staff Writer
    > December 9, 2003
    >
    > Electronic-voting-machine companies announced yesterday that they
    > are banding together to counter mounting concerns about whether
    > their machines are secure enough to withstand tampering by hackers.

    -- 
    Sincerely,
    Henry Schwan
    Paralegal
    Electronic Frontier Foundation
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